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Towards a dependable True Random Number
Generator with self-repair capabilities
Honorio Martin, Giorgio Di Natale and Luis Entrena
Abstract—Many secure-critical systems rely on true random
number generators that must guarantee their operational func-
tionality during its intended life. To this end, these generators are
subject to intensive on-line testing in order to discover any flaws
in their operation. The dependability of the different blocks that
compose the system is crucial to guarantee the security. In this
work we provide some general guidelines for designers to create
more dependable TRNGs. In addition, a case of study where the
system dependability has been improved is presented.
Index Terms—TRNGs, dependability, self-repairable, on-line
testing
I. INTRODUCTION
Nowadays, for many electronic and telecommunication sys-
tems, one of the most important system properties is de-
pendability. Among other aspects, dependability includes the
ability of the system to protect itself against accidental or
deliberate intrusions [5]. Generally, attackers will focus their
efforts against security blocks in order to get access to sensitive
information. So, it is important to implement dependable
cryptographic protocols in order to assure the security of the
system.
The security of many cryptographic systems is related to
the implementation of secure cryptographic algorithms and
communication protocols requiring the use of random num-
bers. These numbers are typically generated inside the system
by a True Random Number Generator (TRNG). Among the
requirements of the generated random numbers stand out good
statistical properties and unpredictability. Many TRNGs that
fulfil these requirements have been proposed in the scien-
tific literature [33][30][34]. In parallel to the development
of TRNGs, there is an increasing demand for other blocks
associated to the random generation as tests that guarantee
TRNG randomness in different scenarios or post-processing
blocks that correct the bias at the output of a TRNG.
These tests usually check for the statistical quality of the
output and the entropy source. Among the first ones stand out
the NIST suite [7] and the AIS-31 tests [4]. These tests can be
divided into those that check for the statistical quality of the
raw data [3] and those that test some physical parameter that is
closely related to the entropy of the source of randomness[31].
Nevertheless, there is an open question in this topic: what
has to be done with a particular generator when a test fails?
To the best of our knowledge, all the aforementioned TRNG
solutions raise an alarm but they provide no specification
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about appropriate actions to recover in case of a fault. These
designs are therefore able to obtain high-entropy TRNGs that,
nevertheless, will be out of service in case of fault.
In addition, on-the-fly tests and post-processing blocks can
be the source of faults in a TRNG. The deactivation of the
alarm test while the post-processing is attacked can lead to
catastrophic consequences in the key generation process. Even
just a controlled bias due to the malfunctioning of the post-
processing block can improve the chances for a subsequent
cryptanalysis. All in all, a realistic scenario where the em-
bedded tests and post-processing blocks will be the target of
attacks must be considered.
In this work we attempt to provide some general guidelines
for designers to create more dependable TRNGs. These guide-
lines will take into account special considerations related to the
indeterministic nature of TRNGs and possible scenarios where
on-the-fly tests and post-processing are faulty. In addition, we
have proposed a novel architecture that is able to operate and
self-recover from different fault scenarios. Our architecture
includes support for some of the aforementioned guidelines
and redundant blocks that allow us to detect, locate and
counteract faults in all the blocks involved in the random
generation. Through a case of study, we have illustrated and
demonstrated the capabilities of the proposed architecture.
The dependability of this proposal has been evaluated by
simulating the injection of different kinds of faults.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
II presents some guidelines to create dependable TRNGs.
Section III describes a case of study where the aforemen-
tioned guidelines are applied. Section IV reports the impact
of the aforementioned guidelines in the main metrics (logic
resources, power consumption and throughput). In Section
IV-B, we validate the system dependability by the simulation
of different faults. Section V summarizes the conclusions of
this work.
II. GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR DEPENDABLE TRNGS
TRNGs play a key role in many security systems. They are
typically dedicated to generate keys, nonces, padding plain-
text, etc. As their correct operation is crucial, special care
must be taken to ensure that the TRNG is dependable against
the multiple threats they are subject to.
Dependability is defined as the ability of a system to deliver
its intended level of service to its users [16]. Regarding
TRNGs, the term dependability is closely related to the guar-
antee of a minimum entropy and a good statistical distribution
of the generated data. Therefore, TRNG dependability will
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depend on the TRNG blocks that generate and guarantee the
aforementioned features.
Fig. 1 shows the main blocks of a TRNG. A typical TRNG
is composed of a digitized noise source, from where the
entropy is extracted, a post-processing block that corrects
the bias and finally some on-the-fly tests that check for the
statistical quality of the generated data. As typical TRNGs are
composed of some digital blocks, widespread hardening so-
lutions that are applied to general-purpose digital circuits can
be considered to increase TRNG dependability. Nevertheless,
the indeterministic nature of TRNGs makes it necessary to
modify somehow these well known techniques and integrate
some new ones.
It is important to note that the applied strategies will depend
on the target application (and its corresponding security lev-
els), the specific TRNG (e.g., entropy extraction mechanism,
post-processing technique, etc.) and the available resources. In
the following subsections we present a number of recommen-
dations that are valid to increase TRNG dependability. We can













Fig. 1. TRNG general scheme
1) Prevention: In this group, methods and techniques fo-
cused on fault prevention, fault tolerance, and fault forecasting
are included. Among the different techniques stand out:
• Reliable Finite State Machines (FSMs): FSMs are
important parts of TRNGs. They are used not only
for the flow control but also in the typical on-the-fly
embedded tests. The well known one-hot encoding with
error detection (parity checker) can be used to increase
the system dependability with a little penalty in area.
Other solutions as duplication with comparison or triple
modular redundancy (TMR) are eligible to enhance FSMs
dependability [10].
• Control surrounding conditions: It is known that fluc-
tuations on environmental or operational conditions can
cause a bias in the TRNG output [27]. It could be
interesting to check some of the main magnitudes that
affect randomness (Temperature, Voltage, etc.) in order
to foresee and prevent a faulty behaviour. Early-warning
threat detection methods, as the canary numbers presented
in [32], are an interesting option. For FPGA implementa-
tions, real time monitoring systems that check the on-chip
sensors can be considered as a straightforward solution
(e.g. Xilinx IP XADC [20]).
• Attack countermeasures: TRNGs are susceptible to
many different attacks because of their paramount im-
portance in critical systems. In recent times, several
attacks have been presented against some specific TRNGs
[29][14][24]. Some of these attacks can be thwarted by
adding lightweight countermeasures in the original de-
sign. For example, temperature or underpowering attacks
can be tackled by reducing the critical path delay of the
circuit. Another solution could be the integration of a
clock-observation circuit in order to ensure a glitch-free
clock signal [14].
• Anti-Aging effects: Circuit aging refers to the deterio-
ration of circuit performance over time. In the specific
case of a TRNG, aging can evolve in an unacceptable
degradation on the randomness. It is known that one
of the main reasons for aging is the switching activity.
SRAM or Ring Oscillator (RO) TRNGs that constantly
change states are more susceptible to aging. Clock gating
or enable gating techniques that disconnect some blocks
of the circuit can be used as a solution for RO TRNGs.
For SRAM TRNGs, the overall lowest aging is achieved
when both PMOS transistors are stressed equally during
the whole lifetime [18].
2) Detection: In order to accomplish the self-repairability
of a TRNG, it is a key aspect to be able to detect different
kinds of faults. Typical scenarios considered in the scientific
literature only include the evaluation of faults in the digitized
noise source (source of randomness and entropy extractor).
Post-processing blocks and on-the-fly tests must be included
as a possible source of faults. Taking this new scenario into
account, it is crucial that the detection strategies answer
the following questions: Where is the fault located? How
bad/harmful is the fault?
Regarding the fault location, designers can make use of
embedded tests in order to identify the faulty component.
These embedded tests are typically designed to check the
minimun entropy generated in the noise source [3] or the
statistical quality of the final output [7]. Consequently, they
can detect a fault in the noise source or in the post-processing.
Some interesting lightweight ad-hoc solutions, that take into
account the TRNG stochastic model, could allow the detection
of faults on the digitized noise source [31]. Other interesting
approximation based on the effects of typical attacks per-
formed against TRNGs was presented in [9]. On the other
hand, redundancy might be applied to detect faults in the on-
board supported tests.
Assessing the harmfulness of a fault is also important
in order to take effective countermeasures for recovery. In
the TRNG case, the harmfulness can be evaluated by using
the embedded tests. For tests that check the noise source,
the most extended approximation relies on the estimation of
minimun entropy [3]. Depending on the application, different
ranges of minimum entropy could be established in order
to distinguish between an acceptable degradation and a fault
that compromises the randomness. In the same way, it is
possible to modify the statistical tests of the output in order
to establish several ranges to differentiate different scenarios.
An appropriate assessing of the fault can avoid an unnecessary
TRNG shut-down.
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3) Response: Once a fault has been detected, the first
step is to consider if the TRNG must be stopped. In the
vast majority of applications, a TRNG must not work if
a certain level of entropy or a good statistical distribution
is not guaranteed at the output. Consequently, the TRNG
must not work if the embedded tests fail. In all other cases,
stopping the TRNG will highly depend on the application.
The response to a fault should be planned well in advance.
Once this first decision is made, additional actions focused on
regaining the TRNG operational status should be taken. These
actions will depend on the available resources, the application
and the TRNG itself. For example, if our application can
tolerate certain degradation on the minimum entropy, an
on-line enhancement of the post-processing could counteract
the fault effects. In the scientific literature, some ad-hoc
solutions that can be used for very specific scenarios have
been proposed [19][12]. More specifically, in [19] the authors
proposed a bias detector that control two tunable ROs to
avoid interlocking between them. In [12], authors increase
the compression factor or decrease the sampling frequency of
a RO-TRNG depending on the distribution of the output.
The aforementioned techniques have been applied in isola-
tion trying to enhance a specific block (typically the digitized
noise source). However, it is important to remark that the
aforementioned techniques must work all together in order to
reach the system dependability. Moreover, a selection of the
different techniques must be integrated in an efficient manner
in order to offer effective countermeasures. All in all, once
the operational framework has been established (application,
TRNG, resources, attack scenarios, etc.), the designer needs to
select different prevention, detection and response techniques
that ensure the system functionality during its intended oper-
ation life.
In this work, we propose the integration of several of these
techniques within a novel architecture. Key novelties in this
architecture are the duplication of noise sources, entropy tests
and post-processing modules, the use of a LFSR for both
testing and operation modes and a checker+controller module
that can guarantee dependability even in the presence of faults
and even under some attacks. As a result, our approach is able
to continue operation with acceptable performance in many
situations where previous techniques would stop operation or
simply fail. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first
work where the entire system dependability is addressed and
demonstrated.
III. A CASE OF STUDY
In this section we present the proposed architecture and
a case of study where we have added support for some of
the aforesaid guidelines (redundancy, one-hot coding, control
main magnitudes, etc.). This architecture is flexible enough to
adapt to different requirements by using a variety of modules.
Through the case of study we illustrate and demonstrate its
capabilities. We have defined a scenario where a RO-TRNG
is used to generate nonces and padding plain-texts. Certain
degradation on the entropy source is allowed. In addition, no
limits in terms of resources are established. The main goals of
our design are to always guarantee a minimum entropy level
and to offer self-recovery capabilities from different scenarios.
A. Fault attack scenarios and fault models
Fault attacks have been widely studied with the purpose of
either extracting sensitive information from a secure device,
or obtaining denial-of-service. In TRNGs, fault attacks can
be used to bias the randomness of the random source so that
predictable numbers can be obtained. While an adversary can
use any kind of fault for performing an attack with catastrophic
consequences, only a subset of those attacks can be actually
exploited in order to retrieve useful information. In order to
limit the study to realistic and exploitable attacks, we have
considered the following fault models and scenarios:
• Bit-flip: A bit flip fault consists in a flipping of a single
bit value stored in a single memory cell. The bit flip can
affect any bit at any time during the execution. Typically,
the bit flip results from a premature power drain on
one of the register cells that can be carried out using
underfeeding or power spikes [11]. Induced electrical
fields and Eddy currents attacks can also lead to this kind
of faults [25]. In high-reliability FPGA implementations,
single event upset (SEU) caused by a ionizing particles
are a growing concern.
• Stuck-at: A stuck-at fault transforms the correct value of
a line to a constant logic value, either a logic 0 or a logic
1. The effects of stuck-at faults are typically considered
as permanent. In practice, the stuck-at model covers many
of the possible manufacturing defects in CMOS circuits
or destructive faults, where it is assumed that a destroyed
wire, gate or memory cell will cause the faulty bit to
be constant. A laser cutter or UV light can be used for
destroying individual structures of the chip that can derive
in stuck-at faults [22] [13].
• Operating condition variations: Temperature and power
supply voltage variations can induce faults through timing
violations. In particular, the increasing of the temperature
or underpowering will increase the critical path delay
causing a malfunctioning [28]. Several temperature and
underpowering attacks have been reported in the literature
[27][14]. A bias at the output is the typical outcome of
these attacks in TRNGs.
B. TRNG blocks
Fig. 2 shows a block diagram of our proposal. For the sake
of simplicity, some signals, blocks and multiplexers have been
omitted. Redundant blocks have been noted as A and B. The
basic idea of our proposed architecture is the following: the
noise sources are checked by 2 entropy test blocks that work
in parallel. The raw output of the noise source (A or B) is
post-processed by either a post-processing block (A or B) or
the LFSR. Then, the output is tested by two FIPS-140 blocks
working in parallel. Finally, the outputs of the different tests
and the surrounding conditions are constantly evaluated by
the checker and controller block. The redundant blocks and
the different modifications of our scheme give the system
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sufficient flexibility to work even under the aforementioned
attack scenarios.
The different block modifications to counteract the afore-
mentioned scenarios are explained in detail in the following
paragraphs.
1) Noise Source: (Inputs: Enable, RST; Outputs: NS-
X). We have selected the RO based TRNG presented
by Sunar et al. in [2] because of its straightforward
implementation and flexibility. In this TRNG the outputs
of several ring oscillators are sampled and then collected
through an XOR-tree to obtain a single bit at the output.
The principle of this generator is simple: if at least one
of the high frequency signals is sampled on the jitter
zone, the output will be random. It seems intuitive that
increasing the number of high frequency signals implies
that it is more likely to sample one in the jitter zone. The
main drawback of this design is that the XOR gate cannot
properly handle the high number of transitions that are
produced by the ROs. In order to overcome this flaw,
Wold et al.[15] proposed a modified version that includes
a flip-flop at the output of each RO (before the XOR gate).
The general scheme of this modified TRNG is depicted in
Fig. 3. As stated in [21], the mathematical proof presented
by Sunar et al. in the original work remains valid after
the modification. We have designed our enhanced TRNG
taking into consideration the original stochastic model.






where m is the number of ROs, T is the clock period and
σacc the accumulated jitter during a period. In order to avoid a
higher number of RO, we have decided to accumulate entropy
during 100 clock cycles. Taking into account the measured
accumulated jitter (σacc = 33ps) and the selected sampling
frequency of 300 MHz, the number of ROs that are necessary
to fulfil the stochastic model are 102 ROs The value obtained
is similar to that published in the original work (N=114)[2] and
in [23]. However, the final number of ROs used in our proposal
has been incremented by 25% (128 ROs) in order to tackle
attacks that take advantage of the RO locking [21]. Finally,
our enhanced TRNG consists of two redundant noise sources
(NS-A and NS-B) that will be used alternatively depending on
the scenario. Each noise source has been oversized in order to
handle different scenarios. More specifically, each noise source
is composed of 256 ROs where only 128 ROs are active in
normal conditions. As shown in Fig. 4, each oscillator consists
of 4 inverters and one NAND gate, the latter being able to
enable/disable the oscillation. The XOR-tree (see Fig. 5) uses
a ripple structure in order to avoid the effects of power and
clock glitches as those presented in [14].
2) Post-processing: (Inputs: RST, NS-X, select order;
Outputs: PP-X). We have selected an nth order parity filter as
a post-processing because of its straightforward implementa-
tion. More precisely, using a shift register and XOR gates, the
parity filter hashes n successive input bits into one output bit
(Fig. 6). This post-processing enhances the entropy per output
bit, but reduces the throughput n times. Taking into account the
stochastic model introduced in the previous section, we have
selected a 100-th order filter in normal conditions and we will
increase the jitter accumulation time by a 10% depending on
the scenarios. We have modified the parity filter in order to
be able to select on-the-fly the filter order (100, 110, 120 and
130-th order). PP-A and PP-B blocks of Fig. 2 correspond to
these redundant post-processing blocks.
3) Embedded Tests: The embedded tests in our proposal
check two different parameters: the minimum entropy gener-
ated by the noise source and the statistical distribution of the
final output. All the tests have been duplicated in order to
detect faults on themselves.
a) Entropy Tests: (Inputs: RST, NS-X, LFSR;
Outputs: Low entropy Alarm, Medium entropy alarm,
Counters). As there is no claim about the noise source to
be identically distributed, we have selected three NIST tests
that are oriented to estimate the mininimun entropy of non
identically distributed (non-IID) number generators [3]. These
generators may have dependencies in time and/or state that
may result in an overestimation of entropy if typical test suites
are used.
The three entropy tests have been selected attending to their
straightforward implementation. We have adopted some work-
ing assumptions that simplify the implementation of these tests
[8]. A random bit will be generated each clock cycle, which
implies that the output space is two (0 or 1). The dataset length
will be 213. Cut-off values have been precomputed for each
test in order to determine different entropy levels (low, medium
and high entropy). Two alarms will be generated: medium
entropy alarm and low entropy alarm. A brief description of
each test is presented below.
The Frequency Test: This test computes the number
of occurrences of the most-likely sample value. The
probability distribution of the samples is modelled from a
noise source. More accurate results can be obtained with
a large dataset. A compact implementation of this test
can be obtained by using an up/down counter.
The Collision Test: A collision can be described as a sub-
sequence of repeated values in a dataset. In our case, the
TRNG only generates two different values (0 or 1), thus
a collision will take place after 2 bits (if they are equal)
or after 3 bits (if the first 2 bits are different). The aim
of this test is to determine the mean collision time until
the end of the dataset is reached by tracking the number
of 2 and 3 bits sub-sequences that contain a collision.
[8]. A lightweight implementation can be obtained using
a simple FSM to detect 3-bits segments that contain a
collision and generate the enable of a counter.
The Partial Collection Test: This test computes the
entropy of a dataset based on how many distinct values
in the output space are observed. To that end, the dataset
is divided into non-overlapping subsets of n bits, where n
is the size of the output space. In this case, it is observed
the number of times that two different vectors {01,10}
appear. A two bit shift register and a XOR gate connected












































Fig. 3. Sunar et al. modified scheme
[1] [2] [3] Enable[4]
Fig. 4. RO with enable
b) Statistical output Tests: (Inputs: RST, PP-X, LFSR;
Outputs: FIPS Alarm, Counters). We adopted the Federal
Information Processing Standard (FIPS) 140 [1] among pub-
lished statistical tests, which consists of the following tests:
Monobit, Poker, Runs, and Long run. The required length of
the sequence is 20000 bits, which implies small demand on
hardware resources. We have precomputed the cut-off values











Fig. 6. nth order parity filter
Monobit: This test is analogous to the aforementioned
frequency test. In this case, it counts the number of ones.
Only a counter is necessary to implement this test.
Poker: The dataset is divided in 4-bit segments and the
number of occurrences of each of the 16 possible 4-bit
values is counted. We have used the simplified equation
presented in [17] to carry out the final computation




1576929). A FSM and 16 counters are necessary to
find the number of occurrences of each 4-bit value. A
DSP block is used to calculate a square in the final
computation.
Runs: A run is defined as a maximal sequence of
consecutive bits of either all ones or all zeros. The test is
passed if the number of runs is within the corresponding
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interval specified [17]. An FSM and several counters are
needed to implement this test.
Long run: A long run is defined as a run of length 26
or more (of either zeros or ones)[1]. The test is passed
if there are no long runs. This test can be implemented
using a counter and simple logic.
It is important to remark that we have used one-hot encoding
with self-recovery for all the FSMs involved in the different
tests. In addition, some output counters were used for testing
purposes. We have estimated a min-entropy of 0.9942 for
normal TRNG operation.
4) LFSR: (Inputs: RST, NS-A, NS-B, Testing Mode;
Outputs: LFSR). Fig. 7 shows a modified Galois LFSR that
is included in our enhanced design. We have implemented a
64-bit LFSR using a primitive polynomial to reach maximal
LFSR length. This LFSR has two operation modes. In the first
one, the LFSR loop is closed so it behaves as a typical LFSR.
This mode will be used to check the embedded tests. In the
second operation mode, the output of the noise source (NS-A
or NS-B) is XOR-ed with the feedback bit in order to use the
LFSR as a post-processing block.
RNG
Fig. 7. Linear Feedback Shift Register
5) Control Operating Conditions: (Inputs: On-Chip-
Sensors; Outputs: External Alarm). As aforementioned,
ROs are quite sensible to variations on operating conditions
such as voltage and temperature[27]. We have decided to
control these parameters in order to guarantee the validity
of the stochastic model. To that end, as the TRNG has been
implented in a FPGA, we have selected the XADC IP provided
by Xilinx [20] due to its straightforward implementation. This
block makes use of the on-chip sensors in order to measure
different magnitudes (Temperature, VCCINT ,VCCAUX and
VBRAM .). If a measurement of an on-chip sensor lies outside
the specified limits, then an alarm is set. We have established
the limits according to the vendor recommendations for the
FPGA (Artix-7). Other techniques as measuring ROs frequen-
cies or those proposed in [9] can be considered as alternatives
methods.
6) Checker + Controller : This block consists of 4 FSMs
that control the different blocks. These FSMs have been
implemented using one-hot encoding and the self-recovery
state is set to the most restricted one in each case.
a) Tests FSMs: (Inputs: Counters; Outputs: Fail A,
Fail B, Error). The purpose of these FSMs is to guarantee
the correct operation of the different tests. To that end, we have
implemented two FSMs: FSMEntropy Tests and FSMFIPS .
Each one receives and compares the outputs (counter values)
of the duplicated tests. Once a fault is detected (counter values
are not equal), an off-line testing mode starts. This off-line
testing mode makes use of the LFSR to generate a known
sequence of bits. The final response of both tests (entropy and
FIPS tests) for this known sequence has been precomputed
and stored in the FPGA. Finally, the precomputed value is
compared to the test results and the faulty test is disconnected.
At this point, as only one test is functional (A or B), the off-
line testing mode will be used for each round of generated bits
(8192 for the Entropy Tests and 20000 bits for the FIPS tests).
If both tests fail, a final error state is reached. It is important
to remark that while the TRNG is on the off-line testing mode,
the TRNG is stopped. In Fig. 8 a simplified state diagram for











Fig. 8. Test FSMs diagram .
b) Noise source FSM : (Inputs: Low entropy Alarm,
Medium entropy alarm, External Alarm; Outputs: Se-
lect NS, Enhance NS, Enhance PP, Error). This FSM re-
ceives the minimum entropy range computed in the entropy
tests and handles the noise source. The alarm signal generated
by the on-chip sensors is also taken into account. Fig. 9 shows
a simplified state diagram for this FSM where two scenarios
are considered.
In the first scenario, a faulty behaviour is discovered in the
noise source thanks to the entropy tests, which can mean either
a slight degradation of the minimum entropy (medium entropy
alarm set) or an unacceptable degradation (low entropy alarm
set). In the first case, the noise source will be reset (transient
ROs shut-down) and an enhancement in the post processing
will be carried out (signal enhance post-processing). If the
degradation persists, 128 extra ROs of the same noise source
will be activated in order to contribute to the randomness.
In addition, an improvement of the post-processing will be
demanded. If this situation lasts, the noise source will be
switched and the maximum post-processing correction will be
required. Finally, an error state that requires the user attention
is reached. It is important to note that the TRNG operation is
not interrupted in this case. In the case of a high degradation
on the entropy (low entropy alarm set), the procedure will be
the same but the TRNG will be stopped until it reaches an
acceptable minimum entropy.
In the second considered scenario, i.e., no fault has been
detected but one of the on-chip sensors has sampled a value
which falls outside the limits, the active noise source will
enhance its response using the available 256 ROs and the
post-processing will be increased in 2 orders. With these
counteractions we will try to anticipate a possible fault.
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If after a fault or a change in the surrounding conditions,
the normal behaviour is maintained during 10 entropy test















Fig. 9. Noise Source FSM diagram.
c) Post-processing FSM: (Inputs: FIPS Alarm,
Enhance PP ; Outputs: Select PP, Select Order, Error ).
This FSM will handle the different post processing blocks
(PP-A, PP-B and the LFSR). If the FIPS alarm is set to 1 or
the signal enhance post-processing (generated by the Noise
Source FSM) is set, the FSM will evolve to the next state.
If the 130th order filter cannot correct the fault, PP-B will
be used to increase the entropy per bit of the final output. If
the parity filter is not enough to obtain an acceptable output,
the LFSR will be used as a post-processing block (mode 2).
Ultimately, an error state will be reached. As in the Noise
Source FSM, a counter is set in order to go back to the
previous state if a normal behaviour is maintained during 10
FIPS tests executions. Fig. 10 presents the different states for
this FSM.
It is important to note that all the FSMs reach a final state of
Error. This state requires the user attention in order to recover
the normal TRNG operation.
7) Anti-aging mechanism: (Outputs: Select NS). ROs
generate a high electronic activity during the random number
generation. This switching activity during a long operation
term will enhance aging effects, that can provoke frequency
variations and may degrade the TRNG output. In order to
guarantee that all ROs will age in the same way, we have
introduced a counter that switches the noise sources (from A
to B and vice-versa) every 1000 generations (i.e., 20 Mb). In
this way, frequency variations of the two redundant versions
of the noise source will be maintained as equal as possible.
IV. EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
A. Hardware Resources
In this subsection we analyse the impact of the TRNG
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Fig. 10. Post-processing FSM diagram.
TABLE I
LOGIC RESOURCES.
Element Sunar[2]+ Wold[15] Sunar + Wold + Tests Our Proposal
Slice LUTs 252 1212 2645
Slice Registers 150 228 1286
DSPs 0 1 2
XADC 0 0 1
BRAM 0 20 Kb 20 Kb
consumption and Throughput. The target FPGA is an Artix-7
35T.
1) Logic resources: Table I shows the LUTs, registers and
DSPs for different TRNG implementations. The first column
shows the modified implementation of Sunar et al. where
only the noise source (128 ROs) and the post-processing are
included. The second column shows the hardware resources
used in an implementation that includes the entropy tests and
the FIPS tests. Finally, the third column shows the results of
our enhanced proposal, which includes redundant blocks.We
have included 20 Kb of BRAM memory in order to store
the generated random numbers until all the test are executed
(randomness guarantee). These BRAM blocks are optional,as
the data could be stored outside from the FPGA, and validated
or discarded after receiving the corresponding error signals.
As expected, our enhanced proposal uses more resources
than the other two implementations. For the purpose of a
fair comparison, the first implementation ( modified Sunar
et al. TRNG) is not compared quantitatively because almost
all the TRNG standards require to test somehow the gener-
ated bitstream [4][3]. Comparing the modified Sunar et al.
implementation with testing capabilities with our proposal, it
can be appreciated the impact of the redundant blocks in the
resources. More specifically, the number of LUTs is roughly
doubled and 5.6 times more registers are used. This increase is
mainly due to the redundant blocks but also to the additional
FSMs, the cut-off values that must be stored and the LFSR




Power Sunar[2]+ Wold[15] Sunar + Wold + Tests Our Proposal
Dynamic 16 mW 60 mW 116 mW
Static 63 mW 75 mW 118 mW
TABLE III
THROUGHPUT.
Sunar[2]+ Wold[15] Sunar + Wold + Tests Our Proposal
3 Mbps 2.994 Mbps 2.994 Mbps
to the noise sources. The 9% of the resources are destined to
the post-processing blocks (8%) and the LFSR (1%). Entropy
and FIPS tests use 8% and 22% respectively. Finally, the
checker and controller use a 19% of the total resources. It
is important to remark that our proposal uses 12.71% of the
available LUTs and a 3% of the flip-flops.
2) Power consumption: Table II shows the power consump-
tion estimations provided by the Vivado tool. We have selected
the default settings for the environment, power supply and
switching activity. The values obtained are comparable to those
published in [23].
As expected, our enhanced proposal consumes almost the
double than the original proposal. It is noteworthy the high
percentage that represents the dynamic power consumption.
3) Throughput: The throughput presented in Table III has
been obtained for a sampling frequency of 300 MHz. A
best case scenario has been considered where only a 100th
order filter is used as post-processing. The noise source of
the three implementations generates one raw random bit per
clock cycle. For the original implementation, this throughput
will only be penalized by the post-processing. The other two
implementations will generate blocks of 20000 random bits
(FIPS dataset length) each 20 ms and the tests will introduce
a latency of around 100 clock cycles. It is important to remark
that all the executed tests are on-the-fly tests that are executed
while the data is generated. The 100 clock cycles are necessary
in order to carry out the final computations of the FIPS tests.
It is also interesting to compare the throughput of our
proposal for three different scenarios where the output is still
random: the best case scenario is the aforementioned scenario
where the post-processing needs are the minimum. We have
defined an intermediate scenario where the maximum filter
order is required. The worst case scenario considers the failure
of one entropy test block, one FIPS test block and both post-
processing blocks. In this scenario, as defined in previous
sections, the off-line testing mode will be activated for both
tests after each execution. In addition the LFSR will be used
in the post-processing. In Table IV the results for the different
scenarios are presented.
TABLE IV
THROUGHPUT OF OUR PROPOSAL FOR DIFFERENT SCENARIOS.
Best Case Intermediate case Worst case
Throughput 2.994 Mbps 2.307 Mbps 0.360 Mbps
TABLE V
FAULT INJECTION CAMPAIGNS SUMMARY.
Type bit flip stuck-at
Injected Faults 15000 53152
Masked 3682 (24.54%) 25768 (48.47%)
Detected 11318 (75.45%) 27384 (51.53%)
Random 199 (1.31%) 0
Not-Random 0 0
B. Fault Injection for Dependability Validation
Fault injection is an effective and widely used method
for test, assessment and dependability benchmarking of fault-
tolerant and fail-safe systems. We have used LIFTING[6] in
order to evaluate the system dependability. LIFTING is an
open source simulator able to perform both logic and fault
simulation for stuck-at faults and single event upset (SEU)
on digital circuits described in Verilog. In addition, this fault
simulator provides many features for the analysis of the fault
results.
In order to use this simulator, we have generated a Verilog
description of the TRNG deterministic parts (Noise source
and XADC IP are not evaluated). We have created a 200000
random bits test bench in order to stimulate the circuit.
Two fault injection campaigns have been simulated: one for
injecting bit-flips and one for single stuck-at faults.
TableV summarizes the results of the different fault injection
campaigns. The first and second rows represent the type of
fault and the number of injected faults respectively. The third
row represents the faults that have been masked (no alarm and
no change at the output). The fourth row presents the number
of faults that have been detected (raise an alarm). The fifth row
-random- shows the number of undetected faults that change
the output but do not have any impact in the statistical quality
of the output. Finally, row six presents the undetected faults
that have an impact in the statistical distribution of the output
(Not-Random).
• Bit-flip fault injection campaign: In order to obtain





1 + e2 · N−1t2·p·(1−p)
)
(2)
The number of samples is expressed in Equation 2, where:
– n is the number of faults to inject;
– N is the overall number of possible injected faults;
– p is an estimation of the value being searched;
– e is the expected margin of error;
– t is the expected confidence level.
Since the overall number of possible faults is extremely
high, we compute the limit of Equation 2 for N tending
to infinite. We also consider the conservative result by











We consider for all experiments a margin of error of
1% with a confidence level of 98%, leading to 15000
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fault injections per program. The results of this injection
show that the proposed enhanced TRNG is able to self-
recover from different fault scenarios. The 24,54% of the
injected faults have been masked. These masked faults
appear because they have been injected in a block that
is not used in that moment or they have been injected
in the FSMs with self recovery, so no effects appear at
the output. The vast majority of the injected faults have
set off an alarm (75,45%). Only a 1,31% of undetected
faults without an impact in the statistical quality of the
output are observed. In this case, all the faults were
injected in the post-processing block so only one bit of the
output changes. However, these bit-flips do not jeopardize
the TRNG security. Indeed, the post-processing block is
composed of 100 bits. Even if one bit is altered, the
overall randomness is not affected since the other 99 bits
will be random. Finally, there is no fault undetected that
compromises the TRNG quality. It is important to note
that the 38% of the faults have been detected instantly
while the other 62% have been detected by the on-the-fly
tests and the checker block.
• Stuck-at fault injection campaign: In this campaign,
an exhaustive simulation that covers the stuck-at 0/1 of
all the nodes on the circuit has been carried out. The
injection of 53152 faults have been simulated. In this case
and for the same reasons than in the bit-flip injection
campaign, the 48,47% of the faults have been masked.
The rest of the faults (51,53%) have raised an alarm. As
expected, in this simulation, all the faults that affect the
output have been detected because their effects are more
noticeable than a simple bit-flip.
It is important to remark that in both fault injection
campaigns, all the faults affecting test blocks have been
detected, so we can guarantee that if not alarm is raised,
all the generated numbers will have a minimum entropy
rate. In addition, it is noteworthy that no faulty output
(Not-Random) has been detected in the aforementioned fault
injection campaigns. In addition to these faults, our proposal
also offers protection against fluctuations on the operation
conditions, clock glitches and aging protection.
In order to show the importance of redundant logic, we
have compared our results with the non-redundant TRNG
implementation (modified Sunar et al. + Tests). We have ob-
tained the number of undetected faults for this implementation.
In the bit-flip campaign, the 44.38% of the faults injected
will pass unnoticed. On the other hand, for the Stuck-at
fault campaign the 59,87% of the faults will be undetected.
Basically, these faults are concentrated in the test blocks that
are not checked. These results demonstrate that, despite the
increase in area and power consumption, redundancy is crucial
to assure dependability.
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have addressed some of the challenges
that TRNGs pose regarding dependability. TRNGs are of
paramount importance in many cryptographic systems, so
their dependability must be assured. This means that all the
TRNG blocks (noise source, post-processing and tests) must be
dependable. The scientific community has focused its efforts
into increasing the entropy level without paying attention to the
system dependability. To the best of our knowledge, this is the
first work where the entire system dependability is addressed.
To that end, we have proposed a number of general guide-
lines that can be applied to TRNG systems in order to
increase their dependability. These techniques include well-
known hardening methods which were adapted for TRNGs. In
addition, we have presented some specific recommendations
that are not typically considered in general-purpose digital
circuits (temperature control, anti-aging mechanisms,etc).
A case of study has been presented in order to verify the
validity of the aforementioned guidelines. More specifically,
we have implemented an enhanced version of the TRNG
presented by Sunar et al. [2] and later modified by Wold et
al.[15]. The flexibility of this proposal has allowed us to apply
different methods in order to increase the system dependabil-
ity. The applied techniques are primarily aimed to guarantee a
minimum entropy level and to offer self-recovery capabilities
from different scenarios including attacks that cause bit-flips
and stuck-at faults. Among the applied techniques stand out the
redundancy applied to several blocks (tests, post-processing,
noise source) and the checker+controller block that manages
the different situations in order to optimize the response for
different faulty states.
We have presented the overhead introduced by the enhance-
ment. In terms of area, power consumption and throughput
the results show that our proposal is affordable for many
applications. Finally, we have carried out two fault injection
campaigns (bit-flip and stuck-at faults) where the dependabil-
ity of our proposal has been tested. No faults that affect the
statistical distribution of the output have passed undetected.
We can conclude that, with an affordable overhead, we have
increased the system dependability being able to counteract
many attack situations.
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